The human resources of Nineveh.

A young, multi-ethnic, multi-confessional population of roughly 3.7 million, still bearing the demographic mark of 2014–2017: 4.89 million Iraqis have returned to their areas of origin since the territorial defeat of Daesh, but over one million remain displaced nationally, including approximately 150,000 Yazidis still in Kurdistan Region camps a decade after the August 2014 Sinjar genocide. This entry surveys what the province has — and what it has lost — in human terms.

Of all the assets a province possesses, the most consequential is its people. Nineveh has historically been one of the most demographically rich in Iraq: a province where Sunni Arabs, Kurds, Yazidis, Assyrian and Chaldean Christians, Shabak, Turkmen, Kaka'i and smaller communities have lived in a dense and overlapping geography around the Mosul urban core and across the Plain. The events of 2014–2017 inflicted demographic damage on a scale not seen since the Anfal campaign of the late 1980s, and the work of repairing that damage — measured in returns, in the rebuilding of household-level human capital, in the restoration of schooling and skills, in the rebuilding of trust between communities — is incomplete and will remain so for the foreseeable future.

This entry presents what is known about Nineveh's human-resources base in 2026: the population structure, the displacement-and-return arc, the Yazidi case in particular, the education and skills base, the labour-force composition (with reference to the more detailed treatment in the Economy entry, § vii), gender, youth, and migration. It closes with the present picture and the open questions about whether the province can rebuild the human-capital base that the recovery requires.

i. Population structure

Nineveh's pre-2014 population was estimated at approximately 3.4 million, making it Iraq's second or third most populous governorate. The most recent estimates from the Iraqi Ministry of Planning, drawing on the November 2024 national census (Iraq's first since 1987 and a substantial source of new demographic data for the country), place the 2025 Nineveh population at approximately 3.7 million — a partial recovery toward the pre-2014 figure, though with the composition substantially changed by the Yazidi displacement, by Christian emigration to Europe, North America and Australia, by the return of a substantial Sunni Arab majority to Mosul, and by net migration from rural districts into the urban centres.

The age structure is young, consistent with Iraq overall. Approximately 40% of the Nineveh population is under 18; the median age is approximately 22 years; and the 15–29 cohort — youth as defined by Iraqi state statistical convention — accounts for approximately 29% of the population, in line with the national figure. The dependency ratio is high: each working-age person supports roughly one dependent on average, with the burden falling particularly on the modest number of formally employed wage earners. The very small over-65 cohort — under 4% of the population — reflects both the historical pattern of high fertility and the toll of conflict mortality on the previous generation.

The ethnic and religious composition (treated in detail in Religions, § ii–v) places approximately 65–70% of the population as Sunni Arab, with Kurdish, Yazidi, Christian (Assyrian, Chaldean and Syriac), Shabak, Turkmen, Kaka'i and smaller communities making up the balance in geographically concentrated patterns: Yazidis in Sinjar district, Christians on the Nineveh Plain (Hamdaniya, Tilkaif), Shabak in Hamdaniya and around Mosul, Kurds in Akre, Sheikhan and the northeastern districts, Turkmen in Tal Afar. The post-2014 trajectory has been one of overall demographic concentration of Sunni Arabs in Mosul and the western districts, alongside the continued exposure of the smaller minorities to displacement and demographic compression.

The urban-rural split is roughly 60:40, with Mosul city accounting for approximately 1.8 million of the governorate population, the smaller towns (Tal Afar, Bashiqa, Bartella, Qaraqosh, Sinjar town, Akre, Shaikhan, the Tilkaif urban core) accounting for several hundred thousand more, and the rural districts of the Jazira, the Nineveh Plain villages, and the Sinjar villages accounting for the remainder. Mosul's growth since 2017 has been substantial, with the city now larger than it was in 2014 due to rural-to-urban migration alongside the original return movement; the Jazira and the southern Nineveh rural districts have been slower to recover their pre-2014 population levels.

ii. Displacement and return, 2014–2025

The 2014–2017 Daesh occupation of Mosul and most of Nineveh produced one of the largest internal displacements in recent Iraqi history. At its peak (2015–2016) approximately 3.3 million Iraqis were internally displaced across the country, with Nineveh accounting for a substantial share — by some estimates the single largest contributor among governorates. The displacement was characterised by both the speed of the initial flight (Mosul fell on 10 June 2014 and the Sinjar massacre occurred on 3 August 2014) and the duration: many Nineveh families were displaced for three to ten years, with significant numbers still displaced today.

By the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix's October 2024 round, approximately 4.89 million formerly displaced Iraqis have returned to their areas of origin since the territorial defeat of Daesh, the vast majority through their own means rather than through formal assisted-return programmes. Nineveh has been the destination of the largest single share of these returns. By the same data, however, over 1 million Iraqis remain internally displaced, with approximately 15% still residing in formal IDP camps (mostly in the Kurdistan Region), of whom approximately 295,602 individuals are in particularly difficult conditions and have been displaced for over seven years. An additional 605,000 returnees (12% of all returnees) are in areas with particularly challenging living conditions, and a further 1.91 million (40%) are in areas of medium severity, according to the IOM Iraq Crisis Response Plan 2025.

The government's camp-closure policy has been a defining political and humanitarian feature of the post-2017 period. The Iraqi Council of Ministers decided in January 2024 that all remaining IDP camps should be closed by 30 July 2024, with financial packages provided for departing families. Towards the end of July 2024 the Government of Iraq announced a postponement of the camp-closure deadline; the policy has since been implemented in a phased manner, with substantial pressure on residents to leave and some forced evictions. In total in 2024 (as of 28 August), 6,704 families (25,522 individuals) had departed the IDP camps in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, either to surrounding areas of displacement or to return to their areas of origin in Salahuddin, Nineveh and Diyala. The Coalition for Just Reparations (C4JR) and other civil-society actors have documented that camp closures have often resulted not in dignified returns but in secondary displacement into informal settlements with even more limited access to public services.

The barriers to return that remain substantive for many Nineveh-origin displaced people are well-documented. They include: property issues (destroyed, occupied, or contested housing — UNESCO documented that approximately 80% of public infrastructure and 70% of homes in Sinjar were left in ruins by 2017, with reconstruction progress uneven); livelihood concerns (the East Mosul IRC labour market assessment finding 56% unemployment, treated in Economy § vii); security concerns (continuing concerns about the presence of armed groups including PMF formations in certain Nineveh Plain and Sinjar areas); documentation barriers (the loss of civil status documents during displacement, with documentary obstacles continuing to limit access to public services for many returnees); service-provision gaps (limited electricity, water, health and education services in some return areas, particularly in Sinjar and parts of the Plain); and increasingly, climate stress (CARE Iraq's 2024 study identified the climate crisis as a hindering factor in some returns, particularly affecting former farmers in drought-affected areas, as discussed in Weather § v).

The donor financial picture has shifted markedly in this period. Since 2022, donors to Iraq have largely disengaged from humanitarian funding; ECHO remains one of the very few donors still actively engaged. The transfer of service delivery from international humanitarian organisations to relevant Iraqi government departments has progressed through 2023, 2024 and into 2025, with mixed implementation results. The Iraqi government's intention to wind down the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) by the end of 2025 represents a substantial change in the international institutional presence in the country. The Iraqi Government's pledged $38 million for Sinjar and the Nineveh Plains reconstruction is a notably modest figure relative to the scale of the destruction. The Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displacement has reduced its support for returnees, citing fiscal constraints.

iii. The Yazidi case

The most acute single demographic crisis of the 2014–2017 conflict was the August 2014 Sinjar genocide committed against the Yazidi community of Sinjar district by Daesh. According to a June 2016 report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), more than 400,000 Yazidis were displaced, captured or killed during the August 2014 events, an action subsequently designated as genocide by the UN, the European Parliament, and multiple national parliaments. Women and girls were taken as sex slaves; thousands were murdered; many male villagers were summarily killed; entire mass graves have been documented in subsequent excavations. The Yazidi community is the second-largest religious minority in Iraq after the Christians; estimates of the pre-2014 Iraqi Yazidi population are approximately 550,000, concentrated primarily in Nineveh (Sinjar district and the Bashiqa-Bahzani area) and Dohuk provinces.

The post-2014 trajectory of the Yazidi community has involved significant emigration alongside displacement. Approximately 100,000 Yazidis sought asylum abroad — in Germany, the United States, Canada, Australia, and other Western countries — and substantial Yazidi communities have established themselves in those destinations. The 2024 figure from the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (The Hague) is that approximately 150,000 Yazidis remain in displacement camps in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq a decade after the events; a smaller number remain in informal settlements outside camps. Approximately 2,500 Yazidis remain unaccounted for, with many believed to be missing in Daesh-controlled or formerly controlled territory. The Yazidi Female Survivors Law (Yazidi Survivors Law / YSL), enacted in 2021, provides a legal framework for reparations and support for women survivors of Daesh sexual violence; the 2023 Iraqi federal budget allocated 25 billion dinars (approximately €16.4 million / $16 million) to support its implementation, though effective disbursement remains limited.

Return to Sinjar has been gradual and uneven. The first significant return wave began in June 2020, with displaced Yazidi families finally beginning to return to Sinjar district after six years of displacement, motivated by exhaustion with camp life and the COVID-19 pandemic exposure risks in dense camp conditions. According to the IOM and the Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displacement, over 600 Yazidis returned to Sinjar from Dohuk in May 2025 alone; most, however, have not received the promised return grant of 4 million dinars (approximately €2,624 / $2,800) or the household items pledged by the government. Following the Iraqi government's 2022 recognition of Yazidi land rights in Sinjar, the Real Estate Registration Department began in April 2025 distributing approximately 1,338 ownership letters and issued 100 title deeds to Yazidi residents in the Dugrey and other sub-districts — a substantive but partial step toward addressing the documentary basis for permanent return.

Structural barriers to a full Yazidi return remain. The presence of armed groups — including Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) formations and other actors — in Sinjar is widely cited by Yazidi advocates as a continuing security concern. Sinjar's infrastructure remains substantially damaged: the 2025 reporting from CARE and IOM consistently cites approximately 80% of public infrastructure and 70% of housing destruction figures from 2017 that have only partially been remediated. Services — electricity, water, education, health — are reported as inadequate in most parts of the district. Reconciliation between Yazidi and Sunni Arab communities, particularly given the participation of some local actors in the 2014 events, has been incomplete. The political representation of the Yazidi community in the Iraqi federal system has been weakened in the past two years: the Yazidi quota seat in the Iraqi parliament, previously reserved for the Yazidi electorate, can in the upcoming election be voted upon by citizens throughout Iraq, increasing the possibility that the seat will be filled by a candidate aligned with broader political blocs rather than by Yazidi community representation.

iv. Education and skills

Nineveh's human-capital base in formal-education terms (treated in detail in Education, § i–v) is being substantially restored. The University of Mosul, the largest public university in northern Iraq with an enrolment of approximately 30,000 students before 2014, was severely damaged in the 2014–2017 occupation (with the central library and several faculties destroyed); restoration of physical facilities and academic capacity has been substantial since 2017. Al-Hadba University (the institution maintaining this archive) was established to provide additional higher-education capacity in Mosul, with a focus on engineering, applied sciences, and contributing to the post-2017 rebuilding of the human-capital base. The Iraqi public-school system in Nineveh has been progressively rehabilitated, with both physical infrastructure and teacher recruitment rebuilt; primary-school enrolment in 2024–2025 was substantially higher than at any point since 2014, and approaching pre-2014 levels in most districts.

The skills profile of the Nineveh workforce is mixed. Traditional craft skills — masonry, joinery, textile work, agricultural skills — survive in the rural and traditional-craft segments of the population, augmented by the approximately 1,300 heritage-craft workers trained through the UNESCO Revive the Spirit of Mosul programme by mid-2023 (Economy, § vi; Heritage, § i). Professional skills — medicine, engineering, education, accounting, IT — were significantly depleted by 2014–2017 emigration, with substantial numbers of doctors, engineers, professors and other professionals having left for the Kurdistan Region, the Gulf, or Europe. The post-2017 partial return of some of this professional cohort has been important but has not fully restored the pre-2014 base. Modern technical and digital skills — software development, modern manufacturing, advanced agriculture — are present in small numbers and represent an area where the province is significantly behind both Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region.

The literacy profile, as captured by Iraqi Ministry of Planning data, places Nineveh adult literacy at approximately 80%, somewhat below the Iraqi national average of 86% reflecting the impact of school disruption during 2014–2017 and the older rural population's lower historical literacy. The youth literacy rate is significantly higher, at approximately 95%, reflecting the steady expansion of primary education across the past two decades. Female literacy in the older cohorts (50+) remains substantially below male literacy in those cohorts; the gap closes in the under-30 cohorts and is essentially absent in the youngest cohorts. The 2014–2017 generation — those who were of primary or early secondary school age during the conflict — represents a partial cohort with educational disruption that the public-school system is still working to address through accelerated learning and remediation programmes.

v. Labour force and employment

The labour-force picture is treated in detail in the Economy entry (§ vii); the principal facts are reproduced here for completeness. The East Mosul IRC labour-market assessment in the immediate post-conflict period found average local unemployment of approximately 56%, particularly high among youth and women, with the post-conflict economy "centred on basic needs" and dependent on the return of government services. The national Iraqi unemployment figure of approximately 13.5%–15.5% (World Bank, October 2025) is significantly worse than the regional Middle East and North Africa average of 10.9%; the Nineveh figure remains structurally above the national one because of the cumulative effects of 2014–2017, the slower pace of private-sector recovery in liberated areas, and the lower absorptive capacity of public-sector employment in Nineveh compared with Baghdad.

The youth employment challenge is acute. With 15–29 year olds representing approximately 29% of the Iraqi population, the labour market needs to generate several hundred thousand new jobs per year nationally simply to absorb the entering cohort. Nineveh's youth — particularly those who came of age during 2014–2017 — face the additional barriers of educational disruption, family economic stress, and (in the case of returnees from displacement) the practical difficulty of building professional networks and skills in a partially reconstructed environment. The strong cultural preference for public-sector employment, combined with the limited absorptive capacity of the private sector in Nineveh, produces a structural mismatch that is one of the principal social challenges of the province.

The female labour-force participation in Iraq is among the lowest in the region, at approximately 11–13% depending on the survey instrument. In Nineveh the figure varies sharply by community: among Christian and Yazidi communities of the Plain it has historically been higher than the Iraqi national average; among the Mosul Sunni Arab community it has tracked the national average; among the rural Sunni Arab and Turkmen communities of Tal Afar and the Jazira it has been lower. The disruption of 2014–2017 affected women's labour-force participation severely — both through displacement (which substantially erodes the women's networks and informal economic activities that account for much of female economic engagement) and through the destruction of small-business and informal-services activities in which women had been most active. The post-2017 recovery in female labour-force participation has been particularly slow.

vi. Migration and the diaspora

Beyond internal displacement, the post-2014 period has seen substantial international emigration from Nineveh, particularly from the minority communities. The Christian community (Assyrian, Chaldean, Syriac), already much-reduced from the much-larger pre-2003 population, has lost a substantial further cohort to emigration since 2014; current estimates place the Nineveh Christian population at approximately 100,000–150,000, down from estimates of 500,000+ in the early 2000s and over 1.4 million for all of Iraq. The Yazidi community has seen approximately 100,000 emigrate as discussed above. The Shabak and Turkmen communities have lost smaller but still significant numbers. Even the Sunni Arab majority has seen substantial emigration, particularly of professionals and the better-educated, to the Kurdistan Region, the Gulf, and Europe.

The Iraqi diaspora from Nineveh constitutes a significant external human resource for the province, with established communities in Germany (largest), the United States, Canada, Australia, the UK, Sweden, and elsewhere. These communities are sources of remittances (a significant source of household income for many remaining Nineveh families), of cultural and religious continuity for the dispersed minority communities (with Assyrian and Yazidi diaspora institutions playing significant roles), and increasingly of expertise and investment for the recovery (with diaspora professionals contributing to NGO programmes, university partnerships, and some commercial investments). The mobilisation of the Nineveh diaspora as a positive force for the province's recovery remains a substantially under-developed possibility.

Internal migration within Iraq continues to shape Nineveh's human-resource base. Rural-to-urban migration from the Jazira and the southern Nineveh districts to Mosul city has been significant since 2017, driven by economic opportunity, security perceptions, and (more recently) climate stress on rain-fed agriculture. The Kurdistan Region remains a major destination for some Nineveh emigrants seeking employment, particularly among Kurds, Yazidis, Christians and Shabak; the Baghdad metropolitan area absorbs others. The result is a continuing population redistribution within Iraq that has substantially altered Nineveh's internal demographic geography over the past decade.

vii. Health and the human capital base

The health of the Nineveh population (treated in detail in Health, § i–vi) is a substantial constraint on the human-resource base. The life expectancy at birth for Iraq is approximately 71 years, somewhat below the regional average and substantially below the high-income world. Within Nineveh, life expectancy is estimated to be slightly lower than the national figure, reflecting the cumulative effects of conflict, displacement and limited health-service access in some districts. Maternal mortality in Nineveh, while reduced from the immediate post-conflict peak, remains higher than the Iraqi average. Child mortality shows a similar pattern.

The mental health burden is substantial and significantly under-addressed. The Yazidi displaced population has been the most-studied case: PMC/NCBI peer-reviewed research has documented substantial rates of post-traumatic stress, depression and anxiety in both camp and out-of-camp displaced Yazidi populations, with no significant difference between camp and out-of-camp settings on most distress measures. Survivors of Daesh captivity, particularly women, face exceptional and continuing mental-health needs that the Iraqi public health system is not currently resourced to address at scale. The broader Nineveh population, displaced and non-displaced, carries a substantial unaddressed mental-health burden from the events of 2014–2017 that will require generational work to fully address.

The nutritional and chronic-disease picture is broadly aligned with Iraqi national patterns: high rates of obesity and Type II diabetes in the urban population, micronutrient deficiencies particularly affecting children in the displaced and returnee populations, and the standard cardiovascular and cancer profile of a middle-income country in the regional climate zone.

viii. Human capital and the recovery

Nineveh's human-capital base is the substrate on which the recovery treated throughout this Record depends. The province has a young, multi-ethnic, multi-confessional population of roughly 3.7 million; a partially rebuilt education system with the University of Mosul and Al-Hadba University at its apex; a labour force of perhaps 1.5 million with structural unemployment that the current economic base cannot absorb; a substantial diaspora; and a long historical tradition of urban professional life centred on Mosul that is now being painstakingly rebuilt. The province has lost — measurably, in numbers we can count — approximately 100,000 Yazidi emigrants, several hundred thousand Christian and other minority emigrants over the past two decades, and a more difficult-to-quantify but very real loss of professional skill across most of the higher-education and modern-economy domains.

The question of human-capital rebuilding intersects with every other domain treated in this Record. The post-2017 recovery in Education (§ i–v) is providing a new generation with the basic schooling that the pre-2014 system delivered to their parents; the slow recovery of the University of Mosul and the establishment of Al-Hadba University and Cihan University-Erbil-Hawler (the latter outside Nineveh but a significant draw for Nineveh students) are rebuilding the higher-education base; the Heritage programme (§ i) has rebuilt traditional-craft skills at scale; the partial reconstruction of the health system (§ iv) is restoring health-service access. But these are partial responses to a deeper question: whether the province can re-attract the professional and modern-economy human capital that has been lost, and whether the next generation will be educated and employed at the scale and quality needed to support a sustained recovery into the 2030s.

The honest answer in 2026 is that this is not yet clear. The under-18 cohort that constitutes 40% of the Nineveh population represents the substantive long-term human resource of the province; whether they receive education, skills training and employment opportunities adequate to their potential will determine the trajectory of the province through the 2030s and 2040s. The structural constraints — fiscal, institutional, security, climate — are real and pressing. The opportunities — the diaspora, the international institutional engagement that survives, the strategic importance of Mosul to the wider Iraqi and Middle Eastern recovery — are also real. The next decade will substantially determine whether Nineveh's human resources are reconstituted at the level and quality the province needs, or whether the demographic and capital losses of 2014–2017 become permanent features of the province's long-term position.

ix. Outlook

Looking ahead, three demographic and human-resource trends will substantially shape Nineveh's medium-term future. First, the completion of the displacement-and-return arc — the resolution, one way or the other, of the remaining displaced Yazidi population, of the contested ownership questions in Sinjar and the Plain, of the camp-closure policy and its consequences, of the trajectory of the Christian and other minority communities — will be a defining process of the late 2020s. The outcome will determine whether the demographic pluralism that has characterised Nineveh for over a millennium is substantially preserved into the 2030s, or whether the demographic compression of the minorities accelerates further.

Second, the youth bulge — the large 15–29 cohort, and the substantial 0–18 cohort behind it — represents either Nineveh's greatest demographic asset or its greatest liability for the coming decade, depending on how the education-to-employment transition is managed. The absence at present of an adequate private-sector base to absorb this cohort into productive employment is the single sharpest human-resource challenge facing the province.

Third, the institutional capacity of the Nineveh public sector — the provincial government, the Department of Planning, the Department of Health, the Directorate of Education, the social-protection apparatus — to engage with these human-resource questions will be tested. The current institutional capacity is real but limited, reliant on continuing federal financial support, and stretched across the many demands of the recovery. The strengthening of provincial-level human-resource planning, statistical capacity, and policy-design capability is one of the under-discussed but critical foundations for the longer-term recovery.

Nineveh's people are, in the end, what the province has. They are also what 2014–2017 most directly attacked. The work of reconstituting the human-resource base of the province — restoring the displaced, rebuilding the lost skills, supporting the young, addressing the trauma, sustaining the diversity — is the principal work that the province has before it for the next quarter-century. How well it is done will determine more than any other single factor what Nineveh becomes in the longer term.

References

1. IOM Iraq Crisis Response Plan 2025 — 4.89 million returnees, 1+ million still displaced, 295,602 in difficult conditions, 605,000 returnees in challenging areas, 1.91 million in medium-severity conditions.
2. IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Iraq, October 2024 round.
3. ECHO EU Humanitarian Aid (December 2024). Iraq Country Strategy Document — January 2024 Council of Ministers camp-closure decision, 6,704 families departed KRI camps by 28 August 2024, July 2024 postponement.
4. Atlantic Council (July 2025). "An open wound, a fading light: Marking eleven years since the Yezidi genocide" — 150,000 Yazidis remain in KRI displacement camps (2024), $38 million federal pledge for Sinjar/Nineveh Plains, PMF presence concerns.
5. USCIRF Annual Report 2025 (April 2025). Iraq country chapter — 200,000 displaced Yazidis still feel unsafe returning, U.S. $500+ million since 2018 for minority survivors.
6. EUAA (2025). Country of Origin Information Report — Iraq Treatment of Ethnic and Religious Minorities — 2,500 Yazidis unaccounted for, 25 billion dinar federal budget allocation, 1,338 ownership letters in April 2025, 4-million-dinar return grant.
7. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (June 2016). Report on Yazidi events — 400,000+ Yazidis displaced/captured/killed in August 2014.
8. ARK International (June/October 2020). "Tired of displacement, Iraq's Yazidi minority return home" — Yazidi return wave commenced June 2020, COVID-19 as catalyst, 550,000 pre-2014 Iraqi Yazidi population estimate, 360,000 still displaced (at time of writing).
9. CARE Iraq (July 2024). 10-year Yazidi displacement report — 1.1 million Iraqis still displaced, 80% public infrastructure and 70% homes Sinjar destruction, climate as return barrier.
10. PMC/NCBI (Najjar et al., 2021). "Association between distress and displacement settings: a cross-sectional survey among displaced Yazidis in northern Iraq" — 1,256 displaced Yazidi participants, mental-health outcomes comparison.
11. Rudaw (May 2025; January 2025). Reports on Sinjar returns from Dohuk and unpaid return stipends.
12. UN in Iraq (June 2025). Security Council Briefing of the Special Representative.
13. World Bank (October 2025). Iraq Country Overview — labour force participation 38%, unemployment 13.5–15.5%, youth (15–29) 29% of population.
14. International Rescue Committee (2018). East Mosul Labour Market Assessment — 56% unemployment in post-conflict period.
15. Coalition for Just Reparations / C4JR (March 2024). "More than 'ink on paper'" — Yazidi Survivors Law implementation analysis.
16. UN Habitat Iraq (2025). Urbanization in Iraq report — 8,000 housing units in liberated areas since 2022, 2.5 million national housing deficit.
17. Iraqi Ministry of Planning, November 2024 census (preliminary results).
18. Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displacement statements (2024–2025) on returnee support and camp closures.
19. UN Secretary-General's Report on Implementation of Resolution 2732 (2024) (30 May 2025).
20. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague (2024). Yazidi displacement statistics.